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JOB CREATIONISM 
Victor Fleischer* 
 
[I]t is the most pro growth tax plan that I can imagine because it doesn’t 
tax investments at all.  You know why?  Because the more you tax 
something, the less of it you get. 
-Sen. Marco Rubio, Republican Presidential Debate, Oct. 28, 20151 
 
Does a low tax rate on entrepreneurial income create jobs?  Tax 
scholars view this question as empirical in nature.  But for many 
policymakers, voters, and even some academics, the relationship between 
taxes and entrepreneurship is a matter of faith.  If there is a question, it is 
one of ideological commitment, not evidence and reason. 
Consider the ease with which politicians claim that tax cuts for 
entrepreneurs and investors create jobs and fuel economic growth.  This 
claim would appear to be a falsifiable claim subject to empirical 
observation and testing.  But evidence in support of the claim is, in fact, 
hard to come by.  The evidence instead suggests that at moderate tax rates 
(below, say, 50 percent), tax policy has little effect on the marginal rate of 
entrepreneurial entry or the marginal growth rate of new firms.  Singling 
out entrepreneurs and their investors for tax breaks is not a policy of job 
creation.  It is job creationism. 
This Article considers four ways of interpreting the phenomenon of job 
creationism:  (1)  as a cynical ploy to shovel tax benefits to the rich; (2)  as 
an exercise in hero worship; (3)  as an ideological claim properly beyond 
the scope of  scientific inquiry; or (4)  as a legitimate empirical comparison 
of our system of entrepreneurial capitalism to other capitalist systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Does a low tax rate on entrepreneurial income create jobs? 
To an academic ear, that question sounds like an empirical question.  But 
the empirical evidence in support of the claim is scant.  For many people 
the question is not empirical but rhetorical.  The relationship between taxes 
and job creation is a question of faith and ideology rather than an 
opportunity for evidence-based analysis and argument. 
Consider the ease with which many politicians claim that tax cuts for 
entrepreneurs and investors spur useful investment, create jobs, and drive 
economic growth.  There is, in fact, little empirical evidence to support the 
claim.  For example, many people have suggested that the increase of 
venture capital investing in the 1980s was attributable to the reduction of 
the capital gains tax rate from 35 percent in the 1970s to 20 percent in the 
early 1980s.  James Poterba investigated the question in a seminal 1989 
study.2  Poterba found no evidence that changes in the capital gains tax rate 
affected the supply of venture capital.3  Most of the capital, he pointed out, 
was provided by tax-exempt investors.4  More recent studies have 
confirmed what most tax academics now believe:  there is little evidence to 
support a claim that U.S. tax policy materially affects the rate of 
entrepreneurial entry or the growth rate of new firms.5 
The persistence of the claim of job creation is understandable.  Many 
economists predict a causal relationship between tax rates and 
entrepreneurial job creation because the theoretical basis for the claim is 
simple, clear, and obvious:  tax rates should directly affect the decision, on 
 
 2. See James M. Poterba, Capital Gains Tax Policy Toward Entrepreneurship, 42 
NAT’L TAX J. 375 (1989). 
 3. Id. at 384 (“It is simply not credible to argue that a substantial fraction of the growth 
in organized venture capital markets since the late 1970s is the result of lower capital gains 
tax rates on investors, since most of the funds have come from investors who do not face the 
personal capital gains tax.  Across-the-board reductions in individual capital gains tax rates 
would have a small effect on the total tax burden on venture capital financiers, while 
conveying large benefits on many assets other than venture capital investments.”); see also 
id. at 375 (explaining that “more than three quarters of the funds that are invested in start-up 
firms are provided by investors who are not subject to the individual capital gains tax”); id. 
at 384 (“[T]here is very limited evidence on the extent to which the supply of entrepreneurial 
activity responds to the relative tax burdens on capital gains and labor income.”). 
 4. See supra note 3. 
 5. See generally Donald Bruce & Beth Glenn, Does the Tax System Measure and 
Encourage the Right Kind of Entrepreneurial Activity?  An Updated Look at the Time Series 
Data, TAX L. REV. (forthcoming); David Clingingsmith & Scott Shane, How Individual 
Income Tax Policy Affects Entrepreneurship, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2495 (2016). 
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the margin, of whether to become an entrepreneur.  If one models an 
entrepreneur as a rational actor deciding whether to continue to work as an 
employee or to start a business, tax ought to be part of the entrepreneur’s 
decision.  Wages are taxed at ordinary income rates, but entrepreneurial 
income is often taxed at capital gains rates.6  An entrepreneur rationally 
should assess the odds of success, assess the risk-adjusted after-tax payoff, 
and make a decision.  If Congress reduces the capital gains rate by some 
amount, entrepreneurial entry ought to increase as more people are enticed 
by larger after-tax returns to starting a business. 
Indeed, it is obvious that at the extreme—say, a capital gains tax rate of 
80 or 90 percent—high taxes would dampen entrepreneurship significantly.  
But capital gains rates have never exceeded 35 percent in the United 
States.7  In the range of tax rates one can observe and reasonably discuss as 
a policy matter, tax is rarely a first order consideration for most 
entrepreneurs.  We should not be so surprised that there is little empirical 
evidence to support a claim that taxes have a significant effect on 
entrepreneurship. 
The available empirical evidence offers few lessons.  Even the direction 
of the tax effect is unclear.  As taxes on ordinary income rise, for example, 
new Subchapter S Corporations are organized, largely to avoid payroll 
taxes.  Some scholars interpret this transformation of labor income into 
business income as evidence of an increase in entrepreneurship.8  More 
likely, choice-of-entity effects are evidence of how economic activity is 
reported, not the amount or nature of the underlying economic activity.  
After all, if one is foolish enough to look at the creation of a legal entity as 
a proxy for entrepreneurship, the city of George Town in the Cayman 
Islands, population 27,704, is the most entrepreneurial city in the history of 
the world, far surpassing today’s Palo Alto, eighteenth-century 
Birmingham, or thirteenth-century Venice. 
  
 
 6. See generally Victor Fleischer, Taxing Alpha:  Labor Is the New Capital, TAX L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 7. 2012 CCH Whole Ball of Tax, WOLTERS KLUWER CCH,  http://www.cch.com/ 
wbot2012/029CapitalGains.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/N2RD-Y238]. 
 8. Julie Berry Cullen & Roger Gordon, Taxes and Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking:  
Theory and Evidence for the U.S., 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1479, 1480 (2007). 
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Figure 1:   
Hotbeds of Entrepreneurship Source:  World Bank9 
 
Economy Year New Business Density 
Number of 
New Limited 
Liability 
Companies 
Virgin Islands, 
British 2009 2,604.76 47,477 
Isle of Man 2012 45.27 2,287 
Guernsey 2014 39.74 1,767 
Jersey 2009 37.57 2,329 
Hong Kong 
SAR, China 2014 31.30 167,280 
 
They say it takes a theory to beat a theory, and my theory is this:  tax is 
not a first-order consideration for most entrepreneurs.  Entrepreneurship has 
long odds; a 1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of success matters 
far more than a 1 percentage point increase in the size of the reward.10  
Moreover, if an entrepreneur believes that her marginal utility curve 
declines as income rises, it may not matter much whether her gains total 
$100 million or $200 million at the end of the day in the somewhat unlikely 
event that everything works out.  In other words, tax breaks for 
entrepreneurs are mostly inframarginal.  Instead of inducing salaried 
workers to become entrepreneurs, tax breaks mostly reward entrepreneurs 
for activity they would have engaged in anyway. 
Even the idea that entrepreneurs make rational present value calculations 
is a bit suspect.  What entrepreneurs take on is not risk but uncertainty.  
Knightian uncertainty cannot be translated to a net present value 
calculation, and without such a calculation, the impact of taxes is hard to 
assess. 
As for investors, tax often is irrelevant for a different reason:  most of the 
capital for entrepreneurial ventures comes from tax-exempt investors like 
pension funds and university endowments.11  Taxable investors, even the 
 
 9. Entrepreneurship, WORLD BANK GRP., http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/ 
exploretopics/entrepreneurship (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/NC9T-RXPR]. 
 10. See generally Susan C. Morse & Eric J. Allen, Innovation and Taxation at Startup 
Firms, 68 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 11. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty:  Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity 
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2008). 
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most sophisticated ones, are sometimes unaware of how their investments 
will be taxed.12  Venture capitalists do pay taxes, occasionally, and the tax 
rate on carried interest is common knowledge.  But unless you believe the 
United States suffers from an undersupply of aspiring venture capitalists, 
the case for a tax break is weak. 
This Article explores the meaning of this gap between job creation claims 
and the empirical evidence.  One possibility, of course, is that those who 
support tax cuts are misreading the evidence.  In the same way that 
ideology can distort the way we interpret evidence about climate change, 
minimum wage laws, or other politically charged topics, we tend to view 
empirical evidence about entrepreneurship through the bias of our 
ideologically driven priors.  There are some highly respected economists 
who take the view that tax cuts fuel entrepreneurship;13 perhaps my own 
analysis of the evidence is distorted by my own cognitive proclivities, 
motivated reasoning, and academic skepticism.  When entering a crowded 
bar, after all, it is natural to seek out one’s friends.  The reader can judge the 
empirical evidence for herself. 
It is not my goal in this Article to blow the whistle on the biased and 
selective use of evidence.  Policymakers ignore academic studies all the 
time.  Instead, I want to consider why, for purposes of public policy, 
empirical evidence seems to be entirely beside the point. 
This Article considers four ways of interpreting the phenomenon of job 
creationism:  (1)  as a cynical ploy to shovel tax benefits to the rich; (2)  as 
an exercise in hero worship; (3)  as an ideological claim properly beyond 
the scope of scientific inquiry; or (4)  as a legitimate comparison of our 
system of entrepreneurial capitalism to other capitalist systems. 
There is some evidence to support each of these explanations.  But in the 
spirit of reading generously, I find the last of these explanations the most 
productive in terms of future research. 
I.  THE EVIDENCE 
Consider the various ways in which the tax code favors entrepreneurial 
income.  These preferences take the form of (1)  generally applicable 
departures from an ideal income tax that benefit entrepreneurial income; (2)  
specially targeted expenditures; and (3)  gaps in the tax base for 
entrepreneurial income.  By contrast, there are few special burdens on 
entrepreneurial income. 
 
 12. See Fred Wilson, Qualified Small Business Stock, AVC (July 28, 2013), 
http://avc.com/2013/07/qualified-small-business-stock/ (“For the past twenty years, the US 
federal tax code has included provisions that allow startup investors to get favorable tax 
treatment on the capital gains they earn on early stage investments.  These provisions are in 
[s]ections 1202 and [s]ections 1045 of the tax code.  I have been in the startup investing 
business for the entire time that these provisions have been in the tax code and to my 
knowledge, I have never taken advantage of them.  So that tells you something, [either] 
about me or the provisions, or both.”) [https://perma.cc/EW8B-XS3J]. 
 13. Cullen & Gordon, supra note 8, at 1501–02 (concluding that combining high 
personal tax rates with low capital gains rates create a strong incentive to start a business). 
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Preference Primary Implied Empirical Claim Empirical Evidence 
Generally Applicable Departures 
Capital gains 
preference A low capital gains rate creates jobs. Scant 
Carried interest The preferential treatment of carried interest creates jobs. None 
Founders’ 
stock 
The preferential treatment of founders’ 
stock creates jobs. None 
Deferral 
Mark-to-market or retrospective capital 
gains taxation would be too difficult to 
implement.
Mixed 
Step up in basis 
at death 
The income from appreciated property 
already has been taxed by the estate tax. Mixed 
Targeted Tax Breaks 
Exclusion of 
gains from 
qualified small 
business stock 
Eliminating the capital gains tax up to $10 
million reduces the cost of capital for new 
start-ups organized as C Corporations. 
Scant 
Rollover of 
gains from 
qualified small 
business stock 
Deferring capital gains reduces the cost of 
capital for new start-ups organized as C 
Corporations. 
None 
Ordinary 
deduction for 
loss 
investments 
Allowing an ordinary deduction reduces 
the cost of capital for start-ups. Scant 
Amortization of 
start-up 
expenses 
Avoiding the normal capitalization rules 
increases the success rate of start-ups, 
which in turn creates jobs.
Scant 
Gaps in the Tax Base 
S Corporation 
avoidance of 
payroll taxes 
S Corporation owners pay themselves a 
reasonable salary subject to payroll taxes. None 
Special Burdens on Entrepreneurial Income 
Loss limitations Loss limitations discourage investment in risky activities. Scant 
Corporate tax 
Entrepreneurs bear the incidence of the 
corporate tax, which discourages 
entrepreneurial entry.
None 
 
Given the array of tax breaks for entrepreneurial activity, one would hope 
for an equally powerful array of empirical evidence.  Empirical evidence is, 
of course, always incomplete.  But it would be hard to defend even a 
modest empirical claim that low capital gains tax rates significantly increase 
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the rate of entrepreneurial entry based on the evidence we have in the 
United States.14 
Donald Bruce and Beth Glenn’s recent article explores the empirical 
relationships between major features of U.S. federal tax policy and 
entrepreneurial activity.15  Because entrepreneurship is not easily captured 
in a single economic variable, Bruce and Glenn use a wide array of proxies 
to measure entrepreneurial activity, such as the number of new firms, the 
amount of income earned by such firms, and the number of jobs created by 
such firms.16  Their article includes proxies on the extensive margin (the 
rate at which new firms organize) and intensive margin (measures of 
success such as income or employment).17  Using a time series regression 
framework, they fail to find significance for most relationships.18  They find 
some variables of significance on the extensive margin—such as the rate of 
entrepreneurial entry—but they explain that the findings likely relate to 
changes in legal form rather than new economic activity.19  When they find 
significance on the intensive margin—such as entrepreneurial success—the 
data points in both positive and negative directions.20  In sum, tax does not 
seem to have much effect on entrepreneurial activity.  The main effect is 
that when the tax rate on ordinary income rises, contractors and other self-
employed people form business entities to shelter income.  This is evidence 
of tax planning, not entrepreneurship. 
David Clingingsmith and Scott Shane review the empirical literature on 
tax policy and entrepreneurship.21  They find that most of the empirical 
studies to date rely on measures of self-employment or Schedule C income 
as a proxy for entrepreneurship.22  The problem with this approach is that it 
systematically excludes venture-backed start-ups, which is the sector that is 
said to drive job creation.  Many studies, moreover, rely on regression 
models to suggest causation without adequately addressing omitted variable 
bias.  Even apart from these methodological issues, the theme is that the 
effect of tax on entrepreneurship is small, unreliable, and inconclusive. 
Even if one were to assume a causal link between taxes and 
entrepreneurial activity, the case for job creationism is questionable.  Tax 
subsidies normally are justified in terms of externalities—that is, social 
 
 14. But see generally WILLIAM M. GENTRY, CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION (2010), http:// 
www.accf.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/capGainsTaxation.pdf [https://perma.cc/U25X-
87QS].  Gentry’s empirical case focuses on lock-in as a potential deterrent to 
entrepreneurship and, importantly, as an inefficiency in and of itself, rather than as evidence 
of tax-deterring entrepreneurship. See id. at 26–29. 
 15. Bruce & Glenn, supra note 5. 
 16. See id. at 5–11. 
 17. See id. at 3. 
 18. See id. at 3, 17. 
 19. See id. at 9–10, 14–15, 17–18. 
 20. See id. at 3, 18. 
 21. Clingingsmith & Shane, supra note 5. 
 22. See id. 
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benefits that are not captured privately.23  Just as we might impose a 
Pigovian tax to curb behavior that causes externalized social costs, we often 
use tax expenditures to subsidize behavior that we think is socially 
beneficial. 
Most of the gains from entrepreneurship are private gains—
entrepreneurial or quasi-monopoly rents—captured by the entrepreneurs 
and investors in the business.24  There is a case to be made that, broadly 
speaking, innovation creates knowledge spillovers.  But it is not clear that 
the knowledge spillovers from innovation in start-ups are more socially 
beneficial than the knowledge spillovers from innovation and research 
conducted by large corporations. 
Similarly, consumers may benefit from innovative products, but typically 
pay a market price for the privilege.  To the extent there is a consumer 
surplus above and beyond the market price, the size of innovation-driven 
consumer surplus is unclear, and it is unclear whether such rents are more 
likely to be created by start-ups like Uber or large corporations like Apple. 
Even assuming the presence of positive social externalities from 
entrepreneurship, one also must consider the social costs of disruptive 
innovation.  When a new company thrives, an old competitor falters, often 
leading to job losses and reduction in the value of related investments.25  
The resulting costs are partly socialized through the bankruptcy process and 
the costs of government-funded social welfare programs. 
II.  IS JOB CREATION AN IDEOLOGY? 
The empirical case for job creation is weak.  What, then, explains its 
widespread acceptance? 
A.  Entrepreneurship As a Euphemism for Rich People 
It is not unthinkable that high net-worth individuals might, through trade 
associations and the like, lobby Congress for special tax breaks.  Rather 
than lobby for declining marginal rates at the top, which could attract 
attention, lobbyists use entrepreneurship as cover. 
Section 1202 of the tax code, for example, affects a very small 
percentage of companies and is not widely understood.26  Until it was made 
permanent in 2015, it had been extended several times on a temporary basis 
 
 23. See generally Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND. 
L. REV. 1673 (2015). 
 24. See generally James M. Buchanan & Roger L. Faith, Entrepreneurship and the 
Internalization of Externalities, 24 J.L. & ECON. 95 (1981) (noting that successful 
entrepreneurship causes pecuniary losses to market incumbents and that the institutional 
design to support entrepreneurship requires that entrepreneurs enjoy the gains but not be held 
liable for the competitors’ losses). 
 25. See C. Mirjam van Praag & Peter H. Versloot, What Is the Value of 
Entrepreneurship?  A Review of Recent Research, 29 SMALL BUS. ECON. 351, 358 (2007). 
 26. See I.R.C. § 1202 (2012). 
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by Congress, making it the sort of tax provision that is lucrative for the 
recipient and Congress alike.27 
Claims about job creation, in other words, simply could be masking run-
of-the-mill interest group politics.  Congress doles out economic rents to 
campaign contributors and threatens to take them away to ensure continued 
contributions. 
It is possible, but my sense is that the prevailing attitude toward tax 
breaks for entrepreneurs is sincere and not (just) a cynical ploy to shovel 
money at rich constituents.  Many of the tax breaks for entrepreneurs and 
their investors are hiding in plain sight, as part of our system’s favorable 
treatment of investment income.  Politicians seem to be sincere in their 
belief that tax cuts will benefit not just rich people but the country as a 
whole. 
B.  Entrepreneurship Policy As Hero Worship 
Hero worship is off-putting.  To most scholars, tax policy is judged in 
terms of fairness, efficiency, simplicity, and administrability.  How the 
story fits into a cultural narrative is neither here nor there. 
Still, the stories that make the American entrepreneur into a hero have a 
power to persuade that data alone cannot match.  You can choose to love or 
hate Steve Jobs, but you cannot ignore him.  We have a natural instinct to 
shape our empirical observations into stories and, especially, into stories 
about heroes and villains.28  Can one really blame Congress for doing this? 
Well, yes.  There is no reason to think that heroes need a tax break to do 
the right thing.  A firefighter does not charge into a burning building 
because of the tax consequences.  Moreover, it is hard to conjure a reason 
why an entrepreneur deserves tax-hero status but a firefighter does not. 
In any event, while hero worship may explain why some policymakers 
seem to ignore the evidence, I still think there is more to it.  Politicians 
always like a good story, but our understanding of the relationship between 
taxes and entrepreneurship is not based on adding up individual stories of 
heroic acts of entrepreneurship.  It is part of a broader system of beliefs, 
ideas, and stories—ideology. 
C.  Entrepreneurship As Ideology 
Entrepreneurship has long been recognized as a kind of ideology, with 
both positive and negative connotations.29  The prevalence of ideology over 
 
 27. See Joseph W. Bartlett, December 2015:  Critical Change in Section 1202 of the Tax 
Law, VC EXPERTS BLOG (Jan. 19, 2016), http://blog.vcexperts.com/2016/01/19/critical-
change-in-the-tax-law/ [https://perma.cc/3M5D-2SRC]. See generally Victor Fleischer, Tax 
Extenders, 67 TAX L. REV. 613 (2014). 
 28. See generally JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES (2d ed. 1968). 
 29. John O. Ogbor, Mythicizing and Reification in Entrepreneurial Discourse:  
Ideology-Critique of Entrepreneurial Studies, in SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS:  
STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS 457, 457 (Mary Godwyn & Jody Hoffer Gittell eds., 2012). 
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evidence is hardly a new problem.  Joseph Schumpeter, for example, 
lamented about the problem in 1947.30 
The link between tax cuts and entrepreneurship in particular most likely 
is traceable to the Reagan revolution.  While we mostly remember the 
1960s and 1970s for high marginal rates on ordinary income, the tax rate on 
capital gains had climbed up to 35 percent by 1972.31  In the 1970s, Martin 
Feldstein and other “supply-siders” built the intellectual case for reducing 
capital gains taxes as a way to increase the rate of savings and capital 
formation.32 
The idea that when you tax something you get less of it is a powerful 
idea—so powerful that it has become a core belief of the prevailing 
economic ideology.  The specific idea that low taxes fuel entrepreneurship 
and job creation is a tenet that is not conditional on underlying facts or 
institutional context.  In this way, the tax treatment of entrepreneurial 
income more closely resembles constitutional rights like freedom of 
religion, freedom of speech, or democratic governance.  Just as we do not 
subject free-speech claims to a cost-benefit analysis, policymakers take the 
effect of taxes on entrepreneurship as a matter of faith, not reason. 
Describing job creationism as an ideology does not excuse us, as 
academics, from our job as skeptics.  Setting the consequences of job 
creationism to one side, there are reasons to question the ideology on its 
own terms.  At its essence, entrepreneurship is about creating economic 
opportunities.  Tax subsidies are justified, if at all, only by reference to the 
economic opportunities actually created.  An ideological preference for 
entrepreneurship is not, or should not be, about low taxes for the sake of 
low taxes.  By allowing how one thinks about economic freedom to dictate 
how one thinks about taxes, an ideological approach confuses how we 
should think about risk, inequality, and merit in an entrepreneurial 
economy. 
Risk.  First, consider how tax preferences distort how we view risk.  The 
tax treatment of entrepreneurial income suggests that certain kinds of risk 
are valued more highly than other kinds of risk.  When it comes to labor 
income, riskiness generally is not valued.  We do not, for example, allow 
lifetime income averaging or other methods of income smoothing.  
Uncertain pay—such as sales commissions, real estate commissions, or 
 
 30. Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Creative Response in Economic History, 7 J. ECON. 
HIST. 149, 159 (1947) (“As it is, most of us as economists have some opinions on these 
matters.  But these opinions have more to do with our preconceived ideas or ideals than with 
solid fact, and our habit of illustrating them by stray instances that have come under our 
notice is obviously but a poor substitute for serious research.  Veblen’s—or, for that matter, 
Bucharin’s—Theory of the Leisure Class exemplifies well what I mean.  It is brilliant and 
suggestive.  But it is an impressionistic essay that does not come to grips with the real 
problems involved.”). 
 31. 2012 CCH Whole Ball of Tax, supra note 7. 
 32. Martin S. Feldstein, American Economic Policy in the 1980s:  A Personal View, in 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980S 1, 13 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1994). 
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lottery winnings—are all treated as ordinary income, not capital gains.33  
Cyclical labor income, like construction work, can result in high pay during 
good times—enough so that one does not qualify for the Earned Income 
Tax Credit—and no pay in lean times, also resulting in no tax credit. 
By contrast, the tax code encourages a positive cultural attitude toward 
entrepreneurial risk by treating certain types of risky pay, such as 
entrepreneurial income or incentive-based compensation, more favorably 
than other types of risky pay.  Entrepreneurial risk is viewed as noble and 
selfless, creating jobs and benefiting others.  Corporate stock and 
partnership interests are treated as capital assets even if the value is tied to 
one’s labor efforts.34  Incentive stock options generate capital gains, not 
ordinary income.35  Investors in venture-backed start-ups can exclude up to 
$10 million in capital gains per investment, rollover gains, or take ordinary 
deductions for what would otherwise be capital losses.36 
It is not self-evident why risk taking by rich executives and venture 
capitalists is more valuable than risk taking by, say, a Korean-American 
grocer, a Mexican-American restaurateur, a farmer in California, or an Uber 
driver in Miami.  Why should the owner of the pin factory receive a tax 
subsidy while the success of the baker is left to the invisible hand?  A more 
balanced approach would allow the tax system to play its natural role as an 
insurance mechanism.  For example, higher tax rates on top-end 
entrepreneurial income would allow for an expansion of the Earned Income 
Tax Credit.37 
Similarly, labor mobility is important for an entrepreneurial economy.  
Yet the tax code does little to compensate workers for the risks associated 
with moving to a new city, and it makes mobility more difficult by 
encouraging home ownership over renting. 
Merit.  The tax code distorts our concept of merit by treating 
entrepreneurial income as if it is more socially valuable than labor income.  
It is not clear why this should be the case even if one favors 
entrepreneurship as a general matter.  Entrepreneurial income is partly 
derived from virtues and talents, but it also is derived in part from social 
advantages, family ties, or luck.  By defining entrepreneurial income as 
virtuous, the tax code reinforces our tendency to treat entrepreneurs as 
heroes even outside the four corners of a tax return.38  Successful 
 
 33. See I.R.C. § 1221(a) (2012) (generally defining a capital asset as “property held by 
the taxpayer”). 
 34. See generally Fleischer, supra note 6. 
 35. See I.R.C. § 422. 
 36. See I.R.C. §§ 1045, 1202, 1244. 
 37. See Richard V. Reeves & Joanna Venator, Are Obama and Ryan Proposals for EITC 
Expansion Pro- or Anti-Mobility?, BROOKINGS (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
blogs/social-mobility-memos/posts/2014/08/01-ryan-poverty-plan-eitc-reeves [https://perma. 
cc/4NVD-9LQ6]. 
 38. See Paul Caron, Fleischer:  Dear Apple, TAXPROF BLOG (May 23, 2013), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2013/05/fleischer--1.html [https://perma.cc/YH8E-
W6M9]; Lydia Depillis, Grilled Apple, NEW REPUBLIC (May 21, 2013), https:// 
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entrepreneurs have become the natural aristocracy, a class of people whose 
success in the business realm justifies higher social status and increased 
influence in the political realm. 
Inequality.  Finally, the tax code’s favorable treatment of entrepreneurial 
income distorts the way we think about income inequality.  One could infer 
that entrepreneurial risk is noble, and entrepreneurial income must be 
derived from merit.  It follows that those individuals who become wealthy 
by those means are noble and meritorious.  And it follows that 
redistribution from the meritorious to the less meritorious would be unjust. 
Even if this were a valid way to think about merit and inequality, it 
obscures the problem of opportunity.  Entrepreneurial income is gained 
justly only if others have been given similar opportunities.  As income 
inequality increases, the opportunities to earn entrepreneurial income tend 
to go to the graduates of Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, and other elite 
schools.  And we know that admission to those schools is not purely a 
matter of innate talent. 
Fifty years ago, it was easier for an immigrant with nothing but talent and 
drive to start a small business and create a vehicle for social mobility for 
herself and her children.  Today, small businesses must compete with Wal-
Mart and Amazon.  Most of the tax breaks passed under the guise of 
helping small business entrepreneurs have the effect of helping those who 
are already well educated and well funded:  fund managers and the founders 
of venture-backed companies. 
Tax policy did not cause inequality.  But the tax treatment of 
entrepreneurial income makes inequality worse at the high end, and the 
stories we tell ourselves about taxes and entrepreneurship perpetuate a myth 
that our treatment of entrepreneurs reduces inequality and promotes social 
mobility. 
Symbolic gestures in the tax code are costly.  They complicate the tax 
code, reduce revenue, encourage wasteful tax planning, and drive up overall 
tax rates, reducing economic efficiency.39  A complex economy demands 
that tax policy be driven by evidence, not ideology.  If it so chooses, the 
government should use other, less-costly methods to affirm the social status 
of entrepreneurs and business executives symbolically. 
D.  Entrepreneurial Capitalism 
The strongest argument that entrepreneurship holds a special place in our 
legal system is one grounded in institutional economics.  One reasonably 
could argue that our system of entrepreneurial capitalism is a superior 
engine of economic growth than the welfare state capitalism of Northern 
Europe, the state-guided capitalism of China, or other varieties of 
 
newrepublic.com/article/113269/apple-ceo-tim-cook-testimony-leads-political-theater 
[https://perma.cc/6APF-VP2Q]. 
 39. See generally Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law:  
Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management As a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 
89 IOWA L. REV. 863 (2004). 
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capitalism observed around the world.  To be sure, as an empirical matter, it 
is hardly self-evident that our system is superior in terms of gross domestic 
product, overall social welfare, average happiness, the welfare of our most 
vulnerable, or any other social welfare function.  The answer of which 
economic system is “best” depends on history, culture, the relationship of 
economic freedom to other freedoms, and other institutional considerations 
that are easier to observe than to quantify.  But it is a reasonable claim to 
make. 
Capitalism succeeds when its economic institutions allow people to 
respond to market incentives, reward innovation, and allow people to 
participate in economic opportunities.40  Entrepreneurship can help expand 
economic opportunities and prevent the stagnation of the upper class in 
economics and politics.  It follows that we should not single out 
entrepreneurship for punitive taxes.  But it does not follow that we should 
single out entrepreneurship for low taxes, either.  From a public policy 
standpoint, entrepreneurship is a means to an end, the goal of which is a 
free society that provides economic opportunity to all and rewards 
innovation, creation, and hard work.  Tax policy toward entrepreneurs 
should be judged based on metrics like the quality of jobs created, social 
mobility, and knowledge spillovers.  Building a system of entrepreneurial 
capitalism that is sustainable in the long run demands that we pay attention 
to a much broader range of issues and policy instruments beyond tax. 
Recall Schumpeter’s warning that entrepreneurial capitalism sows the 
seeds of its own demise.41  The current tax code has become an echo 
chamber for the economic forces driving the increase in income and wealth 
inequality, the blurring of economic and political influence, and the 
degradation of paid work.  Entrepreneurial capitalism creates a dynamic and 
turbulent economy, and the United States is unlikely to adapt to embrace a 
robust welfare state that would cushion the weak from the destruction of 
entrepreneurship. 
CONCLUSION 
Our system of entrepreneurial capitalism is sustainable only if most 
people believe that upward mobility is possible.  Historically, 
entrepreneurship has served as an important engine of social mobility, 
especially for immigrant groups, and it may continue to do so in the future.  
The current array of tax breaks for entrepreneurial income is best described 
as a system that favors rich incumbents and also helps out a few 
entrepreneurs.  We should instead focus on creating an economy that 
maximizes opportunities and leave the tax code out of it. 
  
 
 40. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL:  THE 
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012). 
 41. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
(Rutledge 2003) (1942). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Preference Primary Implied Empirical Claim Empirical Evidence 
Generally Applicable Departures 
Capital gains 
preference.  Gains for 
the sale of capital 
assets held for more 
than one year are 
currently taxed at 20 
percent, compared to 
a top marginal rate of 
39.6 percent on 
ordinary income.42 
A low capital gains rate 
creates jobs. 
Scant.  A 1998 paper 
by Gompers and 
Lerner finds an 
implausibly large 
marginal effect, with 
a one point decrease 
in the capital gains 
rate increasing the 
number of VC-backed 
startups by about six 
per one thousand 
residents.43
Carried interest.  
Carried interest, a 
fund manager’s share 
of partnership profits, 
often qualifies as a 
capital gain even 
when it represents a 
return on labor rather 
than capital.44 
The preferential 
treatment of carried 
interest creates jobs. 
None 
Founders’ stock.  The 
founders and early 
employees of a start-
up often receive 
common stock with a 
value near zero in 
exchange for future 
labor efforts.  
Appreciation in the 
stock is taxed at 
capital gains rates.45 
The preferential 
treatment of founders’ 
stock creates jobs. 
None 
 
 42. See I.R.C. § 1 (2012). 
 43. See generally Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, What Drives Venture Capital 
Fundraising?, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY:  MICROECONOMICS 149. 
 44. See generally Fleischer, supra note 11. 
 45. See generally Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV. 60 
(2011). 
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Deferral.  Under the 
realization doctrine, 
gain or loss in the 
value of a capital 
asset is not taxed until 
disposition of the 
asset.  One can 
minimize tax liability 
by deferring the sale 
of appreciated assets.  
In the context of 
entrepreneurial 
income, the 
entrepreneur forgoes 
wage income, which 
would have been 
taxed immediately, 
and, instead, the value 
of her labor is 
reflected in an (tax-
deferred) increase in 
the value of the 
business. 
Mark-to-market or 
retrospective capital 
gains taxation would be 
too difficult to 
implement. 
Mixed.  The United 
States has not 
attempted accrual or 
retrospective taxation.  
A 2003 paper 
suggests that an 
attempt by Italy did 
not go smoothly.46 
Step up in basis at 
death.  When a 
capital asset such as 
founders’ stock or 
partnership equity is 
transferred by 
bequest, the heir takes 
a stepped-up basis in 
the asset.47  The 
appreciation in the 
value of the capital 
asset is never subject 
to the income tax.  
The value of the stock 
is, however, included 
in the value of the 
estate, and may be 
subject to the estate 
tax. 
The income from 
appreciated property 
already has been taxed 
by the estate tax. 
Mixed.  Founders 
often set up trusts, 
funded with pre-IPO 
stock, to avoid or 
mitigate the impact of 
the estate tax.  On the 
other hand, the 
presence of the estate 
tax induces some 
increase in capital 
gains realizations.48 
 
 46. See generally Julian Alworth et al., “What’s Come to Perfect Perishes”:  Adjusting 
Capital Gains Taxation in Italy, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 197 (2003). 
 47. See I.R.C. § 1014. 
 48. See generally Gerald Auten & David Joulfaian, Bequest Taxes and Capital Gains 
Realizations, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 213 (2001). 
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Targeted Tax Breaks 
Exclusion of gains 
from qualified small 
business stock.  
Section 1202 provides 
for an exclusion of up 
to $10 million in 
gains from the sale of 
qualified small 
business stock.49  
Qualified small 
business stock is 
defined to include 
only Subchapter C 
Corporations, not 
Subchapter S 
Corporations, 
partnerships, or 
LLCs.50 
Eliminating the capital 
gains tax up to $10 
million reduces the cost 
of capital for new start-
ups organized as C 
Corporations. 
Scant.  Gunther and 
Willenborg do find 
that section 1202 
reduced underpricing 
of penny-stock 
IPOs.51  
Rollover of gains 
from qualified small 
business stock.  
Section 1045 provides 
for the unlimited 
rollover of gains from 
one start-up 
investment to 
another.52 
Deferring capital gains 
reduces the cost of 
capital for new start-ups 
organized as C 
Corporations. 
None 
Ordinary deduction 
for loss investments.  
Section 1244 provides 
for an ordinary 
deduction of up to 
$100,000 on what 
would otherwise be a 
capital loss resulting 
from an investment in 
qualified small 
business stock.53 
Allowing an ordinary 
deduction reduces the 
cost of capital for start-
ups. 
Scant.  Cullen and 
Gordon find that 
reducing income tax 
rates decreases 
entrepreneurial 
activity by reducing 
the relative tax 
benefits of 
entrepreneurship; by 
increasing loss offsets 
for investors, section 
1244 provides a 
 
 49. I.R.C. § 1202(b)(1)(A). 
 50. Id. § 1202(c). 
 51. See generally David A. Guenther & Michael Willenborg, Capital Gains Tax Rates 
and the Cost of Capital for Small Business:  Evidence from the IPO Market, 53 J. FIN. ECON. 
385 (1999). 
 52. I.R.C. § 1045. 
 53. Id. § 1244(b). 
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modest increase to 
entrepreneurial 
activity.54 
Amortization of start-
up expenses.  Sections 
195, 248, and 709 
provide favorable 
rules for deducting or 
amortizing expenses 
related to 
investigating and 
organizing a new 
business.55 
Avoiding the normal 
capitalization rules 
increases the success 
rate of start-ups, which 
in turn creates jobs. 
Scant.  Carroll et al. 
provide indirect 
evidence that the cost 
of capital affects the 
rate of capital 
expenditures by sole 
proprietors.56 
Gaps in the Tax Base
S Corporation 
avoidance of payroll 
taxes.  Allocations of 
S Corporation income 
are not wages and 
avoid the burden of 
payroll taxes. 
S Corporation owners 
pay themselves a 
reasonable salary subject 
to payroll taxes. 
None.  Bull and 
Burnham find that S 
Corporation owners 
fail to report 35 
percent of labor 
income.57 
  
 
 54. See generally Cullen & Berry, supra note 8. 
 55. I.R.C. §§ 195, 248, 709. 
 56. See generally Robert Carroll et al., Entrepreneurs, Income Taxes, and Investment 
(NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 6374, 1998). 
 57. See generally Nicholas Bull & Paul Burnham, Taxation of Capital and Labor:  The 
Diverse Landscape by Entity Type, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 397 (2008). 
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Special Burdens on Entrepreneurial Income 
Loss limitations.  A 
symmetric income tax 
would impose no 
burden on risk-taking.  
As illustrated first in a 
model by Domar and 
Musgrave,58 the 
government acts as a 
silent partner in 
investments, taking a 
share of the profits 
but also sharing in 
losses.  Taxpayers 
scale up investments 
in risky activities to 
counterbalance the 
government’s role.  In 
practice, however, 
capital-loss 
limitations impose an 
overall tax burden on 
investments. 
Loss limitations 
discourage investment in 
risky activities. 
Scant.  The limitation 
rarely is binding.59 
Corporate tax.  The 
double tax on 
corporate profits 
imposes an indirect 
economic burden on 
entrepreneurial 
income. 
Entrepreneurs bear the 
incidence of the 
corporate tax, which 
discourages 
entrepreneurial entry. 
None.  Entrepreneurs 
bear at least some of 
the burden of the 
corporate tax.  But so 
does labor outside of 
the entrepreneurial 
context.  Whether the 
incidence is higher or 
lower in one context 
or the other is unclear, 
given that most start-
ups do not pay any 
corporate tax. 
 
 
 58. See Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and 
Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388 (1944). 
 59. See generally Alan J. Auerbach et al., Capital Gains Taxation and Tax Avoidance:  
New Evidence from Panel Data, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?  THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
TAXING THE RICH 355 (Joel Slemrod ed., 2000). 
